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ABSTRACT
This paper quantifies the costs of adhering to a fixed exchange rate arrangement, such as a currency
union, for emerging economies. To this end it develops a dynamic stochastic disequilibrium model
of a small open economy with downward nominal wage rigidity. In the model, a negative external
shock causes persistent unemployment because the fixed exchange rate and downward wage rigidity
stand in the way of real depreciation. In these circumstances, optimal exchange rate policy calls for
large devaluations. In a calibrated version of the model, a large contraction, defined as a two-standard-deviation
decline in tradable output, causes the unemployment rate to rise by more than 20 percentage points
under a peg. The required devaluation under the optimal exchange rate policy is more than 50 percent.
The median welfare cost of a currency peg is shown to be large, about 10 percent of lifetime consumption.
Fixed exchange rate arrangements are found to be more costly when initial fundamentals are characterized
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Fixed exchange rate arrangements are easy to adopt but diﬃcult to maintain. Countries can
ﬁnd themselves conﬁned to a currency peg in a number of ways. For instance, a country
could have adopted a currency peg as a way to stop high or hyperinﬂation in a fast and
nontraumatic way. A classical example is the Argentine Convertibility Law of April 1991,
which, by mandating a one-to-one exchange rate between the Argentine peso and the U.S.
dollar, painlessly eliminated hyperinﬂation in less than a year. Another route by which
countries arrive at a currency peg is the joining of a monetary union. Recent examples
include emerging countries in the periphery of the European Union, such as Ireland, Portugal,
Greece, and a number of small eastern European countries that joined the Eurozone. Most of
these countries experienced an initial transition into the Euro characterized by low inﬂation,
low interest rates, and economic expansion.
The Achilles’ heel of currency pegs is, however, that they hinder the eﬃcient adjustment
of the economy to negative external shocks, such as drops in the terms of trade or hikes in
the country interest-rate premium. The reason is that such shocks produce a contraction
in aggregate demand that requires a decrease in the relative price of nontradables, that is,
a real depreciation of the domestic currency, in order to bring about an expenditure switch
away from tradables and toward nontradables. In turn, the required real depreciation may
come about via a nominal devaluation of the domestic currency or via a fall in nominal prices
or both. The currency peg rules out a devaluation. Thus, the only way the necessary real
depreciation can occur is through a decline in the nominal price of nontradables. However,
if nominal prices, especially factor prices, are downwardly rigid, the real depreciation will
take place only slowly, causing recession and unemployment along the way.
This paper investigates how costly it is to maintain a currency peg, in terms of unemploy-
ment and welfare, for an emerging economy facing large external shocks. To this end, the
paper embeds downward nominal wage rigidity into a dynamic, stochastic, disequilibrium
(DSD) model of a small open economy with traded and nontraded goods. The key feature
that distinguishes our theoretical framework from existing models of nominal wage rigidity
is that in our formulation wage rigidity gives rise to involuntary unemployment. Speciﬁcally,
downward wage rigidity introduces occasionally binding constraints that may prevent the
real wage from falling to the level associated with full employment. A second distinguishing
feature of our model of downward wage rigidity is that it does not rely on the assumption
of imperfect competition in product or factor markets.
We show that in our DSD model, the optimal exchange rate policy takes the form of
a time-varying rate of devaluation that allows the real wage to equal the full-employment
1real wage at all times. Under the optimal exchange rate policy, the central bank devalues
the nominal currency in periods in which the full-employment real wage rate experiences a
sizable decline. These are typically periods in which the economy suﬀers negative external
shocks.
The model is driven by stochastic disturbances to the traded endowment (which can be
interpreted as variations in the terms of trade) and by disturbances to the country interest-
rate premium. We estimate the joint law of motion of these two exogenous variables using
Argentine data and feed it into a calibrated version of the model. We simulate the dynamics
triggered by a large negative external shock like the one suﬀered by Argentina over the period
1998-2001, or peripherical Europe a decade later. Based on the Argentine experience, we
deﬁne a large shock as a situation in which tradable output falls below trend by at least
two standard deviations over a period of two and a half years. We compare the dynamics
predicted by our model economy during the crisis under a currency peg and under the
optimal exchange rate policy. Under the peg, the rate of unemployment rises by more than 20
percentage points. Even though tradable goods are scarce and there is open unemployment
in the nontradable sector, the relative price of nontradables (the real exchange rate) fails to
fall because of the combination of downward nominal wage rigidity and a ﬁxed exchange rate.
By contrast, under the optimal exchange rate policy the government devalues the currency
by more than 50 percent. As a consequence, the real wage falls signiﬁcantly and so does the
relative price of nontradables. The adjustment of the real wage induced by the devaluation
enables the economy to operate at full employment.
We measure the cost of maintaining a currency peg as the diﬀerence between the level of
welfare enjoyed by households under a currency peg and the level of welfare associated with
the optimal exchange rate policy. We ﬁnd that the median welfare cost of living under a
currency peg is enormous, about 10 percent of lifetime consumption. And weak fundamentals
can bring this ﬁgure even higher. In particular, high levels of past wages, a large initial stock
of external debt, a high country premium, and unfavorable terms of trade all exacerbate the
welfare loss of living under a peg.
The remainder of the paper is organized in ﬁve sections. Section 2 develops a dynamic
disequilibrium model of a small open economy with unemployment due to downward wage
rigidity. This section also characterizes aggregate macroeconomic dynamics under a currency
peg and the optimal exchange rate policy. Section 3 presents a quantitative analysis of exter-
nal crises under currency pegs and the optimal exchange rate policy. Section 4 analyzes how
exchange rate policy aﬀects the long-run distribution of external debt. Section 5 calculates
the welfare beneﬁts of switching from a currency peg to the optimal exchange rate policy. It
also studies the robustness of our ﬁndings to variations in the values taken by the calibrated
2parameters. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 A Dynamic Stochastic Disequilibrium Model
In this section, we develop a model of a small open economy in which nominal wages are
downwardly rigid. In the model, the labor market is perfectly competitive. As a result,
even though all participants understand that wages are nominally rigid, they do not act
strategically in their pricing behavior. Instead, workers and ﬁrms take factor prices as given.
The model features a traded and a nontraded sector and aggregate ﬂuctuations are driven
by stochastic movements in the value of tradable output and in the country-speciﬁc interest
rate.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a large number of inﬁnitely-lived households with preferences






where ct denotes consumption, U is a utility index assumed to be increasing and strictly
concave, β ∈ (0,1) is a subjective discount factor, and Et is the expectations operator
conditional on information available in period t. Consumption is assumed to be a composite







t denotes consumption of tradables, cN
t denotes consumption of nontradables, and A,
deﬁned over positive values of both of its arguments, denotes an aggregator function assumed
to be homogeneous of degree one, increasing, concave, and to satisfy the Inada conditions.
These assumptions imply that tradables and nontradables are normal goods.
Households are assumed to be endowed with an exogenous and stochastic amount of
tradable goods, yT
t , and a constant number of hours, ¯ h, which they supply inelastically to
the labor market. Because of the presence of nominal wage rigidities in the labor market,
households will in general only be able to work ht ≤ ¯ h hours each period. Households take
ht as exogenously determined. Households also receive proﬁts from the ownership of ﬁrms,
denoted φt and expressed in terms of tradables. Households have access to an internationally
traded risk-free pure discount bond that pays the country-speciﬁc interest rate, rt, in terms
of tradable goods when held between periods t and t+1. The household’s sequential budget
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where pt denotes the relative price of nontradables in terms of tradables in period t, dt+1
denotes the amount of debt assumed in period t and maturing in period t+1, and wt denotes
the real wage rate in terms of tradables in period t. Households are subject to a no-Ponzi
game constraint of the form
dt+1 ≤ ¯ d, for t ≥ 0, (4)
where ¯ d>0 is the natural debt limit.
The optimization problem of the household consists in choosing contingent plans ct,
cT
t , cN
t , and dt+1 to maximize (1) subject to the aggregation technology (2), the sequential
budget constraint (3), and the borrowing limit (4). Letting λt and µt denote the Lagrange
multipliers associated with (3) and (4), respectively, the optimality conditions associated
















= βEtλt+1 + µt, (7)
µt ≥ 0, (8)
µt(dt+1 − ¯ d)=0 , (9)
where Ai denotes the partial derivative of A with respect to its i-th argument.
Optimality condition (5) can be interpreted as a demand function for nontradables. In-
tuitively, it states that an increase in the relative price of nontradables induces households to
engage in expenditure switching by consuming relatively less nontradables. Our maintained
assumptions regarding the form of the aggregator function A guarantee that, for a given
level of cT
t , the left-hand side of this expression is a decreasing function of cN
t . Figure 1
displays this downward sloping relationship with a solid line. The ﬁgure is drawn in the
space (ht,p t) by taking into account market clearing in the nontraded sector, which will be
introduced later on. The level of cT
t acts as a shifter of the demand schedule for nontradables.
A decline in cT
t causes the demand schedule to shift downward and to the left (see the broken
downward sloping line in ﬁgure 1).
Optimality condition (7) equates the marginal beneﬁts and the marginal costs of borrow-
ing 1/(1 + rt) units of tradables in period t. The left-hand side of this expression indicates





















¯ h = hOPT hPEG
the marginal utility of 1/(1 + rt) units of tradables consumed in period t. The right-hand
side presents the marginal cost of borrowing 1/(1 + rt) units of tradables in period t. This
cost is the sum of two components. One is βEtλt+1, which indicates the decline in utility
caused by the reduction in tradable consumption in period t+1 necessary to repay the extra
debt assumed in period t. The second component of the marginal cost is µt, which measures
the shadow cost of tightening the borrowing limit. This second component is nil in periods
in which dt+1 < ¯ d, that is, in periods in which the borrowing limit does not bind.
2.2 Firms
The nontraded good is produced using labor as the sole factor input by means of an increasing
and concave production function, F(ht). The ﬁrm operates in competitive product and labor
markets. Proﬁts, φt, are given by
φt = ptF(ht) − wtht.
5The ﬁrm chooses ht to maximize proﬁts taking the relative price, pt, and the real wage rate,
wt, as given. The optimality condition associated with this problem is
ptF
0(ht)=wt. (10)
This ﬁrst-order condition implicitly deﬁnes the ﬁrm’s demand for labor. Alternatively, writ-
ing this expression as pt = wt/F 0(ht), it can be interpreted as the supply schedule of non-
tradables. Given the wage rate, an increase in pt induces ﬁrms to hire more hours and hence
supply more nontradable goods. This supply schedule is shown with a solid upward sloping
line in ﬁgure 1. Given the nominal wage rate, Wt, a devaluation acts as a shifter of the
supply schedule. Speciﬁcally, given Wt, an increase in Et lowers the real labor cost, inducing
ﬁrms to expand employment. This shift in the supply schedule is shown with an upward
sloping dashed line in ﬁgure 1.
In the present model, ﬁrms are always on their labor demand curve. Put diﬀerently, ﬁrms
never display unﬁlled vacancies nor are forced to employ more workers than desired. As we
will see shortly, this will not be the case for workers, who will in general be oﬀ their labor
supply schedule and will experience involuntary unemployment.
2.3 Unemployment and Wages
Let Wt denote the nominal wage rate and Et the nominal exchange rate, deﬁned as the
domestic-currency price of one unit of foreign currency. Assume that the law-of-one-price
holds for traded goods and that the foreign-currency price of traded goods is constant and





An assumption that distinguishes the present setup from the existing related literature is
that nominal wages are assumed to be downwardly rigid. Speciﬁcally, we impose that
Wt ≥ γWt−1,γ > 0.
This setup nests the cases of absolute downward rigidity, when γ ≥ 1, and full wage ﬂexibility,
when γ = 0. The presence of nominal wage rigidity implies the following restriction on the









denotes the gross nominal depreciation rate of the domestic currency.
The presence of downwardly rigid nominal wages implies that the labor market will in
general not clear at the inelastically supplied level of hours ¯ h. Instead, involuntary unem-
ployment, given by ¯ h − ht, will be a regular feature of this economy. Actual employment
must satisfy
ht ≤ ¯ h (12)
at all times. Finally, at any point in time, real wages and employment must satisfy the
slackness condition







This condition states that periods of unemployment must be accompanied by a binding wage
constraint. It also states that when the wage constraint is not binding, the economy must
be in full employment.
2.4 General Disequilibrium
Market clearing in the nontraded sector requires that
c
N
t = F(ht). (14)
Combining this market clearing condition, the deﬁnition of ﬁrm proﬁts, and the household’s
sequential budget constraint, equation (3), yields
c
T






We can then deﬁne the general disequilibrium of the economy as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 (General Disequilibrium Dynamics) The general disequilibrium dynam-
ics are given by stochastic processes ct, cT
t , cN
t , ht, pt, wt, dt+1, λt, and µt satisfying (2) and
(4)-(15) given the exogenous stochastic processes yT
t and rt, an exchange rate policy, and
initial conditions w−1 and d0.
We consider two polar cases for the yet unspeciﬁed exchange rate policy: the optimal
exchange rate policy and a currency peg.
72.5 Currency Pegs
Under a currency peg the government commits to keeping the nominal exchange rate constant
over time, Et = Et−1 for t ≥ 0. As a result, the gross rate of devaluation equals unity at all
times:
￿t =1 , (16)
for t ≥ 0. Aggregate disequilibrium dynamics under a currency peg are then given by the
exchange rate policy (16) and the conditions listed in Deﬁnition 1.
Under a currency peg, the economy is subject to two nominal rigidities. One is policy
induced: The nominal exchange rate, Et, is kept ﬁxed by the monetary authority. The
second is structural and is given by the downward rigidity of the nominal wage Wt. The
combination of these two nominal rigidities results in a real rigidity. Speciﬁcally, under a
currency peg, the real wage expressed in terms of tradables, wt, is downwardly rigid, and
adjusts only sluggishly, at the rate (1 − γ), to negative demand shocks. The labor market
is, therefore, in general, in disequilibrium and features involuntary unemployment. The
magnitude of the labor market disequilibrium is a function of the amount by which the past
real wage exceeds the current full-employment real wage. It follows that under a currency
peg, the past real wage, wt−1, becomes a relevant state variable for the economy.
Figure 1 depicts qualitatively the general disequilibrium for a given value of the aggregate
domestic absorption of tradable goods, cT. Assume that the initial desired level of tradable
absorption is cT
0 . Market clearing in the nontraded sector occurs at point A, where the de-
mand function, A2(cT
0 ,F(h))/A1(cT
0 ,F(h)), intersects the supply schedule, (W0/E0)/F 0(h).
At point A, the economy enjoys full employment (h = ¯ h) and the relative price of nontrad-
ables is equal to p0. Suppose now that a negative demand shock, such as a deterioration in
the terms of trade or a rise in the country premium, causes a decline in the desired aggregate
absorption of tradables from cT
0 to cT
1 <c T
0 . This adverse shock causes the demand function
to shift down and to the left. This is because, at each level of nontraded consumption,
households are willing to consume less traded goods only if nontraded goods become rela-
tively cheaper. At the same time the supply schedule does not shift.1 This is because the
combination of a currency peg and nominal downward rigidity of wages prevents the real
wage from adjusting downward. The new intersection of the demand and supply schedules
occurs at point B. At this point, employment is equal to hPEG < ¯ h and the economy suﬀers
from unemployment at the rate ¯ h−hPEG, where hPEG denotes the level of employment that
obtains under the currency peg.
1For expositional convenience, we are assuming here that γ = 1. A value of γ close to but less than unity
would imply a small displacement of the supply schedule down and to the right.
8Alternatively, consider an exchange rate policy that maintains full employment in spite
of the negative external shock. Speciﬁcally, suppose that in response to the negative external
shock, the central bank were to devalue the domestic currency so as to deﬂate the purchasing
power of nominal wages to a point consistent with full employment. That is, suppose that the
central bank sets the exchange rate at the optimal level E1 >E 0 satisfying (W0/E1)/F 0(¯ h)=
A2(cT
1 ,F(¯ h))/A1(cT
1 ,F(¯ h)). In this case the supply schedule would shift down and to the
right intersecting the new demand schedule at point C, where unemployment is nil (h =
¯ h). So, unlike the currency peg, the optimal exchange rate policy deﬂates the real value
of wages, and in this way avoids involuntary unemployment. A further diﬀerence in the
macroeconomic adjustment under a currency peg and the optimal exchange rate policy is
that under a currency peg the relative price of non-tradables falls by less than under the
optimal exchange rate policy. Speciﬁcally, in ﬁgure 1 the relative price of nontradables falls
to pPEG, whereas under the optimal policy, the relative price falls to pOPT <p PEG. This
insuﬃcient decline in the relative price of nontradables stands in the way of households
switching expenditures away from tradables and toward nontradables, which is the root
of the unemployment problem associated with currency pegs. Next, we analyze optimal
exchange rate policy more formally.
2.6 Optimal Exchange Rate Policy
Consider an exchange rate arrangement in which the central bank always sets the devaluation
rate to ensure full employment in the labor market, that is, to ensure that
ht = ¯ h,
for all t ≥ 0. We refer to this monetary arrangement as the full-employment exchange rate
policy. This policy amounts to setting the devaluation rate to ensure that the real wage
















9The assumed properties of the aggregator function A ensure that the function ω(·) is strictly





t ) > 0.
The optimal exchange rate policy stipulates that should the nominal value of the full-
employment real wage evaluated at last period’s nominal exchange rate, ω(cT
t )Et−1, fall below
the lower bound γWt−1, then the central bank devalues the domestic currency to ensure that
ω(cT
t )Et = γWt−1. That is, the devaluation rate makes the nominal wage, Wt, equal to its
lower bound, γWt−1, and at the same time guarantees that the real wage, wt, equal the
full-employment real wage ω(cT
t ). If, in this case, the central bank chose not to devalue, the
economy would experience unemployment, because downward wage rigidities would prevent
the real wage from falling to the full-employment level ω(cT
t ).
In general, any exchange rate policy satisfying ￿t ≥ γwt−1/ω(cT
t ) will ensure full em-
ployment at all times. All exchange rate policies pertaining to this family deliver the same
real allocation and are therefore equivalent from a welfare point of view. From this class of
policies we select the one that minimizes movements in the nominal exchange rate. Formally,









This policy is of interest because it will inform us about the minimum devaluation required
to maintain full employment during an external crisis.
The complete set of equilibrium conditions under the optimal exchange rate regime is
then given by Deﬁnition 1 and the exchange rate policy given in equation (18).
Because under the optimal exchange rate policy the real wage rate is always equal to the











Recalling that ω(·) is a strictly increasing function of tradable absorption, this expression
states that the central bank will devalue the domestic currency only when tradable expen-
diture falls. In light of this result, non-microfounded statistical analysis would conclude
that devaluations are contractionary. However, the role of devaluations under the optimal
exchange rate policy is precisely the opposite, namely, to prevent the contraction in the
tradable sector to spill over into the nontraded sector. It follows that under the optimal
exchange rate policy, devaluations are indeed expansionary in the sense that should they
10not take place, aggregate contractions would be even larger. Thus, under the optimal ex-
change rate regime, our model with downward nominal-wage rigidities turns the view that
‘devaluations are contractionary’ on its head and instead predicts that ‘contractions are
devaluatory.’
The full-employment exchange rate policy completely eliminates all real eﬀects stemming
from nominal wage rigidities. Indeed, one can show that the equilibrium under the optimal
exchange rate policy is identical to the competitive equilibrium of an economy with full wage
ﬂexibility. Since wage rigidity is the only source of distortion in the present model, it follows
that the equilibrium under the full-employment exchange rate policy is Pareto optimal. The
equilibrium dynamics under the optimal exchange rate policy can therefore be characterized
















subject to (4) and (15), where the function vOPT(yT
t ,r t,d t) represents the welfare level of the
representative agent under the full-employment exchange rate policy in state (yT
t ,r t,d t). The
equilibrium processes of all other endogenous variables of the model can be readily obtained
from (18) and the conditions listed in Deﬁnition 1. The following proposition provides a
formal statement of these results:
Proposition 1 The exchange rate policy given in equation (18) delivers a real allocation
that exhibits full employment (ht = ¯ h) at all dates and states and, furthermore, is Pareto
optimal.
Proof: See appendix A.
The fact that the aggregate dynamics under optimal exchange rate policy can be described
as the solution to a Bellman equation greatly facilitates the quantitative characterization of
the model’s predictions.
3 A Quantitative Analysis of External Crises
We wish to quantitatively characterize the response of our disequilibrium model to a large
negative external shock. We have in mind extraordinary contractions like the 1989 or 2001
crises in Argentina, or the 2008 great recession in peripherical Europe. To this end, we
estimate the joint stochastic process of our assumed exogenous driving forces (traded output
and the country interest rate) using Argentine data. We calibrate the remaining structural
parameters of the model to match salient aspects of the Argentine economy. Finally, we
11compute the economy’s response to a large negative shock to traded output under the optimal
exchange rate policy and under a currency peg.
3.1 Estimation of the Driving Process
The law of motion of tradable output and the country-speciﬁc interest rate is assumed to be
















where ￿t is a white noise of order 2 by 1 distributed N(∅,Σ￿). The parameter r denotes the
deterministic steady-state value of rt. We estimate this system using Argentine data over
the period 1983:Q1 to 2001:Q4. We exclude the period post 2001 because Argentina was in
default between 2002 and 2005 and excluded from international capital markets. The default
was reﬂected in excessively high country premia (see ﬁgure 2(b)). Excluding this period is
in order because interest rates were not allocative, which is at odds with our maintained
assumption that the country never loses access to international ﬁnancial markets. This is a
conservative choice, for inclusion of the default period would imply a more volatile driving
force accentuating the real eﬀects of currency pegs on unemployment.
Our empirical measure of yT
t is the cyclical component of Argentine GDP in agriculture,
forestry, ﬁshing, mining, and manufacturing.2 We obtain the cyclical component by removing
a log-quadratic time trend. Figure 2(a) displays the resulting time series. We measure the
country-speciﬁc real interest rate as the sum of the EMBI+ spread for Argentina and the
90-day Treasury-Bill rate, deﬂated using a measure of expected dollar inﬂation.3











; r =0 .0316.
According to these estimates, both lnyT
t and rt are highly volatile, with unconditional stan-
2The data were downloaded from www.indec.mecon.ar.
3Speciﬁcally, we construct the time series for the quarterly real Argentine interest rate, rt,a s1+rt =( 1+
it)Et
1
1+πt+1, where it denotes the dollar interest rate charged to Argentina in international ﬁnancial markets
and πt is U.S. CPI inﬂation. For the period 1983:Q1 to 1997:Q4, we take it to be the Argentine interest rate
series constructed by Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and posted at www.fperri.net/data/neuperri.xls. For the
period 1998:Q1 to 2001:Q4, we measure it as the sum of the EMBI+ spread and the 90-day Treasury bill
rate, which is in line with the deﬁnition used in Neumeyer and Perri. We measure Et
1
1+πt+1 by the ﬁtted
component of a regression of 1
1+πt+1 onto a constant and two lags. This regression uses quarterly data on
the growth rate of the U.S. CPI index from 1947:Q1 to 2010:Q2.
12Figure 2: Traded Output and Interest Rate in Argentina, 1983:Q1-2008:Q3
(a) Traded Output












































Note. Traded output is expressed in log-deviations from trend. Source: See the main
text.
13dard deviations of 12.2 percent and 1.7 percent per quarter (6.8 percent per year), respec-
tively. Also, the unconditional contemporaneous correlation between lnyT
t and rt is high and
negative at -0.86. This means that periods of relatively low traded output are associated
with high interest rates and vice versa. The estimated joint autoregressive process implies
that both traded output and the real interest rate are highly persistent, with ﬁrst-order au-
tocorrelations of 0.95 and 0.93, respectively. Finally, we estimate a steady-state real interest
rate of 3.16 percent per quarter, or 12.6 percent per year. This high average value reﬂects the
fact that our sample covers a period in which Argentina underwent a great deal of economic
turbulence.
We discretize the AR(1) process given in equation (20) using 21 equally spaced points
for lnyT
t and 11 equally spaced points for ln(1 + rt)/(1 + r). We construct the transition
probability matrix of the state (lnyT
t ,ln((1+rt)/(1+r))) by simulating a time series of length
1,000,000 drawn from the system (20). We associate each observation in the time series with
one of the 231 possible discrete states by distance minimization. The resulting discrete-
valued time series is used to compute the probability of transitioning from a particular
discrete state in one period to a particular discrete state in the next period. The resulting
transition probability matrix captures well the covariance matrices of order 0 and 1.
During the great Argentine crises of 1989 and 2001 traded output fell by about two
standard deviations within a period of two and a half years. Accordingly, we deﬁne an
external crisis in our theoretical model as a situation in which tradable output is at or above
trend in period t and at least two standard deviations below trend in period t + 10. To
characterize the economy’s behavior during such episodes, we simulate the model for 20
million quarters and identify episodes in which movements in traded output conform to our
deﬁnition of an external crisis. We then average the responses of all variables of interest
across the crisis episodes and subtract their respective means taken over the entire sample
of 20 million quarters. The beginning of a crisis is normalized at t =0 .
Figure 3 displays the predicted average behavior of the two exogenous variables, traded
output and the country interest rate, during a crisis. The downturn in traded output can
be interpreted either as a drastic fall in the quantity of tradables produced by the economy
or as a collapse in the country’s terms of trade. The ﬁgure shows that at the trough of the
crisis (period 10), tradable output is 23 percent below trend. The contraction in tradable
output is accompanied by a sharp increase in the interest rate that international ﬁnancial
markets charge to the emerging economy. The country interest rate peaks in quarter 10 at
about 12 percentage points per annum above its average value. This behavior of the interest
rate is dictated by the estimated negative correlation between tradable output and country
interest rates.
14Figure 3: The Source of a Crisis



















































































quarters since onset of crisis




σ 5 Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of consumption
yT 1 Steady-state tradable output
¯ h 1 Labor endowment
a 0.26 Share of tradables
ξ 0.44 Elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables
α 0.75 Labor share in nontraded sector
γ 0.99,0.98 Degree of downward nominal wage rigidity
β 0.9375 Quarterly subjective discount factor
3.2 Calibration
We adopt a CRRA form for the period utility function, a CES form for the aggregator






















We calibrate the model at a quarterly frequency using data from Argentina as shown
in table 1. Reinhart and V´ egh (1995) estimate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
to be 0.21 using Argentine quarterly data. We therefore set σ equal to 5. We normalize
the steady-state levels of output of tradables and hours at unity. Then, if the steady-state
trade-balance-to-output ratio is small, the parameter a is approximately equal to the share
of traded output in total output. We set this parameter at 0.26, which is the share of traded
output (as deﬁned above) observed in Argentine data over the period 1980:Q1-2010:Q1.
Gonz´ alez Rozada et al. (2004) estimate the elasticity of substitution between traded and
nontraded consumption, ξ, using time series data for Argentina for the period 1993Q1-
2001Q3. A value of 0.44 is also consistent with the cross-country estimates of Stockman
and Tesar (1995). These authors include in their estimation both developed and developing
countries. Restricting the sample to include only developing countries yields a value of ξ of
0.43 (see Akinci, 2011). Following Uribe’s (1997) evidence on the size of the labor share in
the nontraded sector in Argentina, we set α equal to 0.75.
A novel parameter in our model is γ, which measures the degree of downward inﬂexibility
16in nominal wages. To our knowledge, no econometric estimate of this parameter exists for
emerging or developed countries. One diﬃculty in estimating γ is that it belongs to an
occasionally binding constraint. Therefore, the econometrician cannot rely on an equation
that holds in every period and features γ among its parameters. We calibrate γ to 0.99. This
value implies that nominal wages can fall frictionlessly by 4 percent per year. In section 5.1,
we consider a value of γ of 0.98. We regard this value as capturing an environment with
relatively large wage ﬂexibility. For nominal wages (real wages under a currency peg) can
fall by up to 8 percent per year without impediments.
In the absence of direct estimates of γ, we appeal to indirect evidence of downward
rigidity in nominal wages to gauge the plausibility of our calibration. There is empirical
evidence on the observed frequency of nominal wage cuts, which supports our assumption
of downward nominal wage rigidity. Gottschalk (2005), for example, uses SIPP panel data
to estimate the probability of wage declines, increases, and no changes for male and female
hourly workers working for the same employer over the period 1986-1993 in the United States.
He ﬁnds that for males the probabilities of wage increases, wage constancy, and wage declines
are, respectively, 41.2, 53.7, and 5.1 percent per year. The corresponding probabilities for
females are 46.5, 49.2, and 4.3 percent. This ﬁnding suggest that over the course of one year
a very small fraction of workers experiences a decline in nominal wages. Barattieri, Basu,
and Gottschalk (2010) report similar ﬁndings using data from the 1996-1999 SIPP panel.
Interestingly, this study is not restricted to workers working for the same employer. This
evidence, although suggestive of downward wage rigidity, does not directly provide guidance
on how to calibrate γ. The reason is that it does not provide information about the typical
size of the average wage cut.
More direct evidence supporting our calibrated value of γ can be found by examining
the behavior of nominal wages in Argentina during the second half of the Convertibility
Plan (1996-2001). Figure 4 displays nominal (peso) wages, real (dollar) wages, the nominal
exchange rate, and subemployment (deﬁned as the sum of unemployment and underemploy-
ment) for Argentina during the period 1996-2006. The subperiod 1998-2001 is of particular
interest because the Argentine central bank was holding on to the currency peg in spite of
the fact that the economy was undergoing a severe contraction and both unemployment and
underemployment were in a steep ascent. In the context of a ﬂexible-wage model, one would
expect that the rise in unemployment would be associated with falling real wages. However,
during this period, the average nominal wage never fell. Indeed, because the Argentine peso
was pegged to the dollar, the dollar wage rose throughout the 1998-2001 contraction. We
interpret this as indirect evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity, suggesting a value
of γ greater than or equal to unity. Additionally, the fact that real wages fell signiﬁcantly
17Figure 4: Nominal Wages and Unemployment in Argentina, 1996-2006




























Nominal Exchange Rate (E
t)
























































Source. Nominal exchange rate and nominal wage, BLS. Subemployment, INDEC.
18and persistently with the devaluation of 2002 suggests that the 1998-2001 period was one of
censored wage deﬂation, which further strengthens the view that nominal wages suﬀer from
downward inﬂexibility.
We note that during the 1998-2001 Argentine contraction, consumer prices, unlike nom-
inal wages, did fall signiﬁcantly. The CPI rate of inﬂation was on average -0.86 percent per
year over the period 1998-2001. This evidence provides some support for our assumption
that downward nominal rigidities are less stringent for product prices than for factor prices.
A third source of evidence suggesting a value of γ close to unity is provided by the behavior
of unemployment and nominal wages in the periphery of the eurozone in the aftermath of the
great recession of 2008. . Figure 5 displays the unemployment rate and the nominal wage
in Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain during the period 2000 to 2010. Before
the great contraction of 2008 all countries experienced signiﬁcant growth in nominal (and
real) wages and either declining or stable rates of unemployment. The 2008 crisis caused
unemployment rates to rise sharply across all ﬁve countries. However, these large increases
in unemployment did not result in nominal wage cuts. On the contrary, nominal wages
continue to rise in all countries with the exception of Estonia, where wages did not fall but
ﬂattened. Again, these data suggest a value of γ greater than or equal to unity. In light of
this and the above pieces of empirical evidence on downward wage inﬂexibility, we view our
calibration of γ as conservative.
The ﬁnal parameter we calibrate is the subjective discount factor β. We set this parameter
so as to match a foreign-debt-to-output ratio of 26 percent per year, a value in line with
that reported for Argentina over our calibration period by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
In the context of our model, the task of calibrating β is complicated by the fact that the
debt-to-output ratio is highly sensitive to the assumed monetary regime. This is problematic
because in emerging countries in general and in Argentina in particular, monetary regimes
tend to change frequently and widely. A compromise is therefore in order. In calibrating
β, we assume that the underlying monetary regime takes the form of a currency peg. This
strategy results in a value of β of 0.9375. In section 5.1 we explore the sensitivity of our
results to changes in β.
3.3 Crisis Dynamics Under the Optimal Exchange Rate Policy
We numerically approximate the equilibrium dynamics under the optimal exchange rate
policy by applying the method of value function iteration over a discretized state space.
Under optimal exchange rate policy, the state of the economy in period t ≥ 0 is the triplet
{yT
t ,r t,d t}. In subsection 3.1, we explain the method employed for discretizing the exogenous
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20state space {yT
t ,r t}. In the discretization of the endogenous state dt, we use 1001 equally
spaced points. We set ¯ d at the natural debt limit, which we deﬁne as the level of external
debt that can be supported with zero tradable consumption when the household perpetually
receives the lowest possible realization of tradable endowment, yTmin, and faces the highest
possible realization of the interest rate, rmax. Formally, ¯ d ≡ yTmin(1 + rmax)/rmax.
Given our discretized estimate of the exogenous driving process, ¯ d equals 8.34. We ﬁx the
upper bound of the debt grid at 8. The reason why we set this upper bound slightly below
the natural debt limit is that our numerical algorithm requires evaluating the aggregator
function for consumption at all points in the discretized state space. If we allowed the state
to take the value (yTmin,rmax, ¯ d), traded consumption would take zero or negative values
for all possible choices of next-period debt in the grid. As a result, the aggregate level of
consumption would not be deﬁned at this particular state. Experimenting with values for
the upper bound of the debt grid closer to the natural debt limit did not aﬀect our results.
Figure 6 displays with broken lines the average response of the economy under the optimal
exchange rate policy to the large negative external shocks displayed in ﬁgure 3. The collapse
in tradable output and the interest-rate hike both exert substantial downward pressure on
domestic absorption. To maintain full employment in the nontraded sector, the government
engineers a signiﬁcant expenditure switch away from tradables and toward nontradables. The
instrument the government uses to accomplish this expenditure switch is a series of large
devaluations of the domestic currency of about 40 percent per year during the contractionary
phase of the crisis. The main purpose of these devaluations is to lower labor costs in the
nontraded sector. In turn, the decline in labor costs allows ﬁrms to lower the relative price
of nontradable goods in terms of tradable goods, which results in a depreciation of the
real exchange rate. The purchasing power of wages in terms of the composite consumption
good, Wt/Pt, falls by about 40 percent and the real exchange rate, pt ≡ P N
t /Et, depreciates
by about 70 percent, where Pt denotes the nominal price of one unit of the composite
consumption good in period t, and P N
t denotes the nominal price of one unit of nontradable
consumption in period t.4
During the crisis, the constraint on nominal wage cuts is typically binding. Therefore,
the median quarterly proportional decline in nominal wages is 1−γ, or 1 percent per quarter,
implying a cumulative decline of about 10 percent over the course of the crisis. The nominal
price of nontradables mimics the behavior of nominal wages. To see this, note that under the
optimal exchange rate policy P N
t must satisfy P N
t F 0(¯ h)=Wt, which implies that the nominal










21Figure 6: The Dynamics of a Crisis: Response to a Two-Standard-Deviation Fall in yT
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22price of nontradables remains relatively ﬂat as the large nominal devaluations occur. This
prediction of our model is remarkable because nominal prices of nontradables are assumed
to be fully ﬂexible. The predicted sluggish adjustment of the nominal price of nontradables
is in line with the empirical ﬁndings of Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005) who report
that the primary force behind the observed large drop in the real exchange rate that occurred
after the large devaluations in Argentina (2002), Brazil (1999), Korea (1997), Mexico (1994),
and Thailand (1997) was the slow adjustment in the nominal prices of nontradable goods.
In the tradable sector, the expenditure switch is reﬂected in a drastic fall in tradable
consumption of about 40 percent. In fact the fall in the domestic absorption of tradable
goods is larger than the contraction in the supply of tradables. This results in a signiﬁcant
improvement in the trade balance from slightly below trend to about 10 percent of tradable
GDP above trend. However, because of the elevated debt-service cost stemming from the
interest-rate hike, the large improvement in the trade balance is not suﬃcient to prevent
external debt from growing during the crisis.
The large optimal devaluations that take place during the crises are prima facie an indi-
cation that rigidly adhering to a currency peg during times of duress might carry nontrivial
real eﬀects in terms of unemployment, output, and welfare. We turn to this issue next.
3.4 Crisis Dynamics Under A Currency Peg
At center stage in our analysis is the characterization of the costs of maintaining a currency
peg. A currency peg is meant to capture, for example, the monetary policy in place in
Argentina between April 1991 and December 2001 or the monetary restrictions faced by the
small emerging economies that are members of the Eurozone, such as Greece, Portugal, and
Ireland.
Approximating the dynamics of the model under a currency peg is computationally more
demanding than doing so under optimal exchange rate policy due to the emergence of a
fourth state variable, wt−1. In addition, the disequilibrium dynamics cannot be cast in
terms of a Bellman equation because of the distortions introduced by nominal rigidities. We
therefore approximate the solution by Euler equation iteration over a discretized version of
the state space (yT
t ,r t,d t,w t−1). The discretization of the exogenous states yT
t and rt is as
described in section 3.2. For the discretization of the endogenous states, we use 501 equally
spaced points for external debt, dt, and 500 equally spaced points for the logarithm of wt−1.
The calibration of the model is the same as the one discussed in section 3.2.
Figure 6 depicts with solid lines the dynamics induced by a large crisis when the monetary
policy takes the form of an exchange rate peg. As in section 3.3, a crisis is deﬁned as the
23average response of the economy to a situation in which in period 0 tradable output is
at or above trend and in period 10 it is at least two standard deviations below trend. By
construction, the behavior of the exogenous variables, traded output and the country interest
rate, are identical to that shown for the case of optimal exchange rate policy (see ﬁgure 3).
The central diﬀerence in the response to an external crisis between the currency-peg
economy and the optimal exchange rate economy is that under a currency peg the contraction
in the traded sector spills over to the nontraded sector. This is because the monetary
authority fails to devalue the domestic currency preventing real wages and thus also marginal
costs in the nontraded sector from adjusting downward. With real wages too high, the labor
market is in disequilibrium and unemployment emerges. At the same time, because marginal
costs are high, ﬁrms are unwilling to cut the relative price of nontradables. Consequently,
there is no expenditure switching away from tradables toward nontradables. Put diﬀerently,
the combination of downward nominal wage rigidity and a currency peg hinders the ability of
the price system to signal to ﬁrms and consumers the relative aggregate scarcity of tradable
goods and the relative aggregate abundance of nontradable goods.
The collapse in the demand for nontradables pushes the unemployment rate up by more
than 20 percentage points. Moreover, unemployment is highly persistent. Even ﬁve years
after the trough of the crisis, the unemployment rate remains more than 7 percentage points
above average. This sluggishness in unemployment is due to the fact that real wages adjust
slowly downward at the rate γ. The predicted unemployment is involuntary, in the sense
that every unemployed individual would be willing to work at the going wage rate.
The predictions of our disequilibrium model suggest that a hands-oﬀ policy approach
whereby the necessary real depreciation is let to occur via deﬂation, while maintaining a
currency peg, is highly costly in terms of unemployment and forgone consumption of non-
tradables. Although the currency-peg economy displays a mild deﬂation during the crisis,
the fall in nominal product prices is too small and too slow to bring about the eﬃcient real
depreciation required to avoid unemployment. It is interesting to point out that nominal
product prices fail to decline to the level consistent with full employment in spite of the fact
that they are fully ﬂexible. The reason for the seemingly sticky behavior of product price
inﬂation is that, because nominal wages are downwardly rigid, marginal costs remain high
and therefore ﬁrms are unable to cut prices without making losses.
A further distortion introduced by the combination of downward wage rigidity and a
currency peg is an excessive absorption of tradable goods during the crisis. The excess
consumption of tradables (relative to what is optimal) is driven by the fact that the exchange
rate does not depreciate suﬃciently in real terms. Under a currency peg the improvement
in the trade balance during the crisis is more modest than under the optimal exchange
24Figure 7: The Distribution of External Debt



















rate policy, spurring a more rapid rise in external debt driven by the higher interest rates.
Indeed, the suboptimal behavior of the external debt aﬀects the country’s long-run ability
to accumulate external ﬁnancial obligations. Next we explore the relationship between the
exchange rate regime and the level and volatility of external debt.
4 Debt Dynamics
An important ﬁnding of the present study is that the distribution of external debt depends
signiﬁcantly on the exchange rate regime in place. Figure 7 documents this ﬁnding. It dis-
plays the unconditional distribution of the external debt in the stochastic steady state of the
currency-peg and optimal exchange rate economies. The debt distribution associated with
the optimal exchange rate economy features a higher mean and is more concentrated about
the mean than the debt distribution associated with the currency-peg economy. Speciﬁcally,
the mean debt under the optimal exchange rate policy is 5.8 (or 146 percent of the annual
steady-state endowment of traded goods) and the standard deviation is 0.4 (or 10 percent
of annual traded endowment). By contrast, in the currency-peg economy the mean external
debt is 3.4 (or 84 percent of annual steady-state tradable output) with a standard deviation
25of 0.8 (or 20 percent of annual tradable output).
These diﬀerences in the distribution of the level of external debt are due to the fact that
in the currency-peg economy the price mechanism that induces households to drastically cut
their absorption of tradable goods during periods in which the traded endowment is low and
the interest rate is high malfunctions due to the real rigidity imposed by the combination
of downward nominal wage rigidity and a currency peg. During crises, the currency-peg
economy takes on too much external debt. The resulting path of debt is excessively volatile.
The only way such debt dynamics can be supported in the long-run is by lowering the
average level of external debt. In summary, ineﬃcient short-run volatility acts as a borrowing
constraint and has long-run eﬀects on the debt distribution.
The prediction that the average level of external debt is higher under the optimal exchange
rate policy than under a currency peg depends, however, on the relative magnitudes of the
intra- and intertemporal elasticities of substitution, ξ and 1/σ, respectively. Our baseline
calibration assumes that the intratemporal elasticity exceeds the intertemporal elasticity,
0.44 versus 0.2. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set at a higher value than the
intratemporal elasticity, it becomes possible that the average level of external debt is higher
in the currency-peg economy than in the optimal exchange rate economy. Figure 8 illustrates
this point. It displays the distribution of external debt under the optimal exchange rate policy
and the currency peg for the case that the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is smaller
than the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ξ<1/σ. Speciﬁcally, in producing the
ﬁgure we set ξ at 0.15 and maintain all other parameters at their baseline values, including
1/σ =0 .2. Under this calibration, the mean external debt is larger under a peg than under
the optimal exchange rate policy.
The reason why the diﬀerence in mean debt under the peg and the optimal policy depends
on the diﬀerence between the intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities of substitution is
that this diﬀerence governs the relative response of tradable consumption to disturbances
in the marginal utility of wealth. In appendix B, we show that the elasticity of traded
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where η ∈ (0,1) is a measure of the share of tradable consumption in total consumption.
This expression shows that in the special case in which the intratemporal and intertemporal
26Figure 8: The Distribution of External Debt when ξ<1
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27elasticities of substitution are equal to each other (ξ =1 /σ), the wealth elasticity of traded
consumption is the same under both exchange rate regimes. That is, a given rise in the
marginal utility of wealth, due, for instance to a fall in tradable endowment or a rise in the
world interest rate when households are net external debtors, causes the same proportional
decline in the consumption of tradable goods under a peg and under the optimal exchange
rate policy. However, when the intratemporal elasticity of substitution exceeds the intertem-
poral elasticity (ξ>1/σ), as is the case in our baseline calibration, then the contraction in
tradable consumption triggered by a given proportional increase in the marginal utility of
wealth is smaller under a peg than under the optimal exchange rate policy. It follows that
in this case, during a crisis, the economy experiences a smaller improvement in the trade
balance and larger accumulation of external debt under the currency peg than it does under
the optimal exchange rate policy. The reverse is true when the intratemporal elasticity is
smaller than the intertemporal one.
The intuition behind this ﬁnding is as follows. One can show that tradable and nontrad-
able goods are gross substitutes in consumption if the intratemporal elasticity of substitution,
ξ, is larger than the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/σ. That is, if ξ>1/σ, then
traded consumption falls when the relative price of nontradables declines. During a crisis,
the relative price of nontradables falls by much more under the optimal exchange rate regime
than under a currency peg. Therefore, under gross substitutability, traded consumption falls
by more under the optimal exchange rate regime than under the currency peg. This implies,
in turn, that the economy displays a smaller improvement in the trade balance and a larger
deterioration in the external debt position during a crisis under a currency peg than it does
under the optimal exchange rate policy. The reverse is he case if tradables and nontradables
are gross complements (ξ<1/σ).
5 The Welfare Costs of Currency Pegs
In our model, there are two sources of welfare loss associated with a currency peg. The
most important one is that a currency-peg economy is prone to persistent unemployment
spells (see ﬁgure 6). Under our calibration the average unemployment rate under a currency
peg is 14 percent. As a consequence the average supply of nontraded goods is lower than
in the optimal exchange rate economy, in which unemployment is zero at all times. The
second source of welfare loss is that the currency-peg economy experiences large swings in
net foreign asset holdings, and, as a consequence, must overaccumulate external assets to
maintain solvency (see ﬁgure 7).
We quantify the welfare cost of living in an economy in which the central bank pegs the
28currency by computing the percent increase in the consumption stream of the representative
household living in the currency-peg economy that would make him as happy as living in
the optimal exchange rate economy. This computation must take explicitly into account the
transitional dynamics induced by the switch from a peg to the optimal policy. Speciﬁcally,
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Solving for λ(yT
t ,r t,d t,w t−1), we obtain
λ(y
T
t ,r t,d t,w t−1)=
￿
vOPT(yT
t ,r t,d t)(1 − σ)+( 1− β)−1
vPEG(yT
t ,r t,d t,w t−1)(1 − σ)+( 1− β)−1
￿1/(1−σ)
− 1.
This expression makes it clear that the compensation λ(yT
t ,r t,d t,w t−1) is state dependent.
Speciﬁcally, the distribution of λ(yT
t ,r t,d t,w t−1) depends upon the distribution of the state
(yT
t ,r t,d t,w t−1). The ergodic distributions of debt under the currency peg and under the op-
timal policy do not have the same support. Therefore, in order to compute λ(yT
t ,r t,d t,w t−1)
one must evaluate the welfare function vOPT(yT
t ,r t,d t) at levels of debt outside of the sup-
port of its ergodic distribution under the optimal policy. Having computed λ(yT
t ,r t,d t,w t−1)
for all values of the state in its ergodic distribution under the currency peg, we proceed to
compute the probability density function of λ(yT
t ,r t,d t,w t−1) by sampling from the ergodic
distribution of the state under the currency peg.
Figure 9 displays with a solid line the unconditional probability density function of
λ(yT
t ,r t,d t,w t−1) expressed in percentage points. The probability density is highly skewed
to the right, implying that the probability of very high welfare costs is nonnegligible. The
unconditional median of the welfare cost of a currency peg is 10.4 percent of the consump-
tion stream. That is, households living in a currency peg economy require 10.4 percent
more consumption in every date and state in order to be indiﬀerent between staying in the
currency-peg regime and switching to the optimal exchange rate regime. This is an enormous
number as welfare costs go in monetary business-cycle theory. Even under the most favor-
29Figure 9: Probability Density Function of the Welfare Cost of Currency Pegs
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able initial conditions, the welfare cost of a currency peg is large, 5.6 percent of consumption
each period. (This ﬁgure corresponds to the lower bound of the support of the probability
density of λ(yT
t ,r t,d t,w t−1).)
The welfare consequences of unemployment under a currency peg are reﬂected in the
implied average levels of consumption. Eventhough the currency-peg economy enjoys 8.5
percent higher average consumption of tradables (due to lower average debt holdings), ag-
gregate consumption under the currency peg is 5 percent lower than under the optimal
exchange rate policy. This is because, due to unemployment in the nontraded sector, con-
sumption of nontradables under the currency peg is on average 11 percent lower than under
the optimal exchange rate regime. As mentioned earlier, this is the main reason why the
welfare costs of currency pegs are so high in our model.
The long-run eﬀects of the exchange rate regime on asset accumulation also play a role
in determining the cost of currency pegs. Under a peg, the inability of relative prices to
correctly signal the relative scarcity of traded goods implies large swings in the country’s
external debt position (see ﬁgure 7). As a consequence of the high volatility in the net debt
position, risk-averse agents overaccumulate foreign assets. This excessive asset accumulation
is costly. A switch from a currency peg to the optimal exchange rate regime allows agents to
30Figure 10: Welfare Cost of Currency Pegs as a Function of the State Variables


























































Note. In each plot, all states except the one shown on the horizontal axis are ﬁxed at their
unconditional mean values. The dashed vertical lines indicate the unconditional mean of the state
displayed on the horizontal axis (under a currency peg if the state is endogenous).
reduce their average asset holdings, which results in temporarily high levels of consumption
of tradable goods.
The marked skewness of the unconditional distribution of the welfare cost of currency
pegs suggests that there are initial states at which an economy undergoing a currency peg
is particularly vulnerable. Figure 10 sheds light on what these states are. It displays the
welfare cost of currency pegs as a function of the four state variables. In each panel only one
state variable is allowed to vary (along the horizontal axis) and the remaining three state
variables are ﬁxed at their respective unconditional means (under a currency peg, in the
case of endogenous states). The ﬁgure shows that currency pegs are more painful when the
country is initially more indebted, when it inherits higher past real wages, when the tradable
sector is undergoing a contraction (due, for example, to unfavorable terms of trade), and
when the country interest-rate premium is high. Viewing the recent debt crisis among
eurozone emerging countries through the lens of our model, it is not diﬃcult to understand
why doubts about the optimality of European monetary union are the strongest for member
31Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis
Parameterization Welfare Cost of Currency Peg
Median Mean
Baseline 10.4 12.3
Higher patience (β =0 .945) 8.0 9.2
Higher elasticity of substitution (ξ =0 .88) 8.6 10.8
Higher intertemporal elast. of sub. (σ = 2) 9.9 10.8
Less downward rigidity (γ =0 .98) 6.7 8.1
countries like Greece, Portugal, and Spain: These are countries with highly inﬂexible labor
markets that before the 2008 crisis experienced large increases in wages (see ﬁgure 5) and
sizable current account deﬁcits.
5.1 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we study how the welfare costs of currency pegs are aﬀected by alternative
parameterizations of the model. We begin by considering the case that households are more
patient. A reason for considering this case is that in principle there exist two equivalent
strategies to calibrate the subjective discount factor β. One strategy is to match the mean
net external debt to output ratio. The other is to match the mean trade-balance-to-output
ratio. When working with actual data, however, these two strategies are not equivalent
because of the necessity to use ﬁnite samples and because of the presence of measurement
error. In our baseline calibration we adopt the strategy of matching the average debt-to-
output ratio in Argentina, which as mentioned earlier is 26 percent over the calibration
period. This approach delivers a trade-balance-to-output ratio of 3.7 percent which is higher
than the value of 2.2 percent observed over our calibration period. We now calibrate β so
as to match this value of the trade-balance-to-output ratio. This requires raising β from its
baseline value of 0.9375 to 0.945. The raising of the discount factor results in a decline in the
average debt-to-output ratio in the currency peg economy from 26 to 15 percent of annual
output. Table 2 shows that under this alternative calibration the welfare costs of a currency
peg relative to the optimal exchange rate policy has a median of 8 percent and a mean of 9.2
percent of the consumption stream. These ﬁgures are smaller than those corresponding to
the baseline calibration but still extremely large as costs of business cycles go. As discussed
earlier, in our economy with downwardly rigid wages a currency peg acts like a borrowing
constraint. This is because a currency peg induces a more dispersed debt distribution, which
requires a lower mean debt (or higher precautionary savings) to ensure long-run solvency.
More patient agents are in general less negatively aﬀected by a given borrowing limit than
32are less patient agents. This explains why the welfare cost of a currency peg under the
current calibration is smaller than under the baseline calibration.
An important parameter in our model is ξ measuring the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution between traded and non-traded goods. A reason why this parameter is im-
portant in our model is that the higher is the elasticity of substitution between tradables
and nontradables, the smaller is the real depreciation required to bring about the necessary
expenditure switch away from tradables and towards nontradables in response to negative
aggregate demand shocks. It follows that the higher is ξ the less disruptive is the presence of
nominal downward rigidities in wages for macroeconomic adjustment. We therefore consider
a value of ξ that is twice as large as our baseline value. This value is in line with the one
obtained by restricting the cross-country sample of Stockman and Tesar (1995) to include
only developed countries, (see Akinci 2011). This higher value of ξ is also consistent with the
estimates reported in Ostry and Reinhart (1992) for a panel of Latin American countries.
Consistent with our intuition, we ﬁnd that the average unemployment rate falls from 14 to
11 percent as ξ increases from its baseline value of 0.44 to 0.88. And the median welfare cost
of a currency peg relative to the optimal exchange rate policy falls from 10.4 to 8.6 percent
of the consumption stream. These ﬁgures show that even in an environment in which con-
sumers can substantially more easily substitute tradables for nontradables, currency pegs
continue to be extremely painful.
We also investigate the sensitivity of our ﬁndings to increasing the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, 1/σ. Speciﬁcally, we lower σ from its baseline value of 5 to a value of 2.
This latter value is widely used in emerging-country business-cycle analysis, see Uribe (2011)
and the references cited therein. Raising the intertemporal elasticity of substitution makes
households less risk averse and as a result more willing to assume external debt. Holding all
parameters other than σ constant at their baseline values, the lowering of σ results in debt
distributions (under both the currency peg regime and the optimal exchange rate regime)
that pile up to the left of the natural debt limit. The implied debt-to-output ratios are many
times larger than those observed over our calibration period. For this reason, we adjust the
value of β from its baseline value of 0.9375 to 0.964 to ensure that together with a value of
σ = 2, the currency-peg economy delivers an external debt share in line with that observed
over the calibration period (about 26 percent of annual output). In contrast to the baseline
calibration, under the present calibration the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/σ,
exceeds the intratemporal elasticity, ξ. As a consequence and as suggested in section 4, the
average debt to output ratio is higher in the currency peg economy than in the optimal
exchange rate economy (0.24 versus 0.14, respectively), which represents a reversal of the
predictions obtained under the baseline calibration. Table 2 shows that under this alternative
33calibration the welfare costs of currency pegs continue to be extremely high with a median
of 9.9 percent of consumption per period. This ﬁgure is slightly smaller than its baseline
counterpart. This is expected because less risk averse agents are more tolerant to economic
ﬂuctuations, and because consumption is more volatile in the currency peg economy than in
the optimal exchange rate policy economy. However, in our general disequilibrium model,
the bulk of the welfare losses associated with a currency peg stems not from this second-
order source but from the average unemployment induced by this type of policy, which is a
ﬁrst-order eﬀect. And the high rate of unemployment induced by a currency peg appears
to be robust to changes in σ. Speciﬁcally, when σ takes the value of 2, the average rate of
unemployment continues to be high, above ten percent. Such a high rate of unemployment
implies a permanent loss of nontradable output of about 12 percent per period, which given
the weight of 0.74 of nontradable consumption in the aggregator function implies a permanent
loss of total consumption of about 9 percent per period. This loss of consumption is entirely
avoided under the optimal exchange rate policy because in that case the economy is always
operating at full employment.
The fact that the main source of welfare losses associated with currency pegs is unem-
ployment in the nontraded sector suggests that a key parameter determining the magnitude
of these welfare losses should be γ, which governs the degree of downward nominal wage
rigidity. Our baseline calibration assumes that nominal wages can fall frictionlessly by four
percent per year, γ =0 .99. We now double the degree of wage ﬂexibility by allowing nom-
inal wages to fall costlessly by up to 8 percent per year, γ =0 .98, while keeping all other
parameters of the model at their baseline values. Table 2 shows that the median welfare
cost of a currency peg falls signiﬁcantly from 10.4 to 6.7 percent of the consumption stream,
as the degree of downward wage ﬂexibility increases from 4% per year to 8% per year. The
intuition why currency pegs are less painful when wages are more downwardly ﬂexible is
straightforward. A negative aggregate demand shock reduces the demand for nontradables
which requires a fall in the real wage rate to avoid unemployment. Under a currency peg this
downward adjustment must be brought about exclusively by a fall in nominal wages. The
less downwardly rigid are nominal wages, the faster is the downward adjustment in both the
nominal and the real wage and therefore the smaller is the resulting level of unemployment.
Still, a median welfare cost of 6.7 percent of each period’s consumption is an enormous ﬁgure
in the context of business-cycle analysis.
346 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we show that currency pegs can be extremely costly to sustain when nominal
wages are downwardly rigid. The reason is that the presence of two nominal rigidities, namely
a ﬁxed exchange rate and a downwardly sticky nominal wage, results in a real rigidity. In
the context of our model, this real rigidity takes the form of downward sluggish adjustment
of the real wage expressed in terms of tradables. In turn, the sluggish downward adjustment
in the real wage makes the labor market vulnerable to large unemployment spills when
the economy suﬀers adverse external shocks such as increases in the country interest rate
premium or deteriorations in its terms of trade.
We develop a novel dynamic stochastic disequilibrium model of a small open economy that
captures well the real aﬀects of the aforementioned dual nominal rigidity. We then quantify
the real eﬀects and welfare consequences of a currency peg in the context of our disequilibrium
model. To this end, we estimate the driving forces of the model using data from a small
emerging economy. We then feed these processes into our disequilibrium model, which allows
us to characterize the macroeconomic dynamics implied by a currency peg. We ﬁnd that a
large external shock, deﬁned as a two-standard-deviation collapse in the value of tradable
output, causes massive unemployment of about 20 percent of the labor force. This ﬁgure is
consistent with the unemployment observed in the aftermath of recent large contractions in
emerging market economies that followed a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, including Argentina
1998-2001 and the periphery of the European Union (e.g., Latvia, Greece, Portugal, Spain,
and Ireland) post 2008. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that under a currency peg unemployment is
highly persistent. Our model predicts that even ﬁve years after the trough of the crisis the
unemployment rate remains above 8 percentage points above average.
We contrast the behavior of the economy under a currency peg to that under the optimal
exchange rate policy. We show that the optimal exchange rate policy completely eliminates
the real eﬀects of nominal downward wage rigidities. In particular, the optimal policy is
able to bring about full employment of the labor force at all times. An important feature
of the optimal exchange rate policy is that during an external crisis of the type described
above the central bank engages in a series of large devaluations of the domestic currency.
These devaluations are aimed at lowering the real value of the downwardly rigid nominal
wage to a level consistent with full employment. Interestingly, these devaluations occur
in the context of a severe contraction of economic activity and domestic spending driven
by adverse shocks in the traded sector. As a result, under optimal exchange rate policy,
the model predicts a positive correlations between the rate of devaluation and economic
crisis. This pattern of correlation could lead non-structural econometric analysis to wrongly
35conclude that devaluations are contractionary. The reason that such a conclusion would be
misplaced is that under optimal exchange rate policy devaluations prevent economic crises
originating in the traded sector from spreading to the non-traded sector, that is, absent a
devaluation the recession caused by the negative external shock would be more severe. We
therefore conclude that in the context of our model devaluations are not contractionary but
rather contractions are ‘devaluatory.’
Our quantitative model allows us to address the question of how costly currency pegs
are in terms of welfare. We ﬁnd that these costs are enormous. At the median of the
distribution of welfare costs, households living under a currency peg require a ten percent
increase in consumption every period to be as well oﬀ as households living in an economy
in which the central bank implements the optimal exchange rate policy. The source of these
large welfare costs is primarily that currency pegs entail high levels of unemployment which
aﬀects negatively the supply and ultimately the domestic absorption of nontradable goods.
We ﬁnd that the welfare costs of currency pegs are larger than its median of ten percent
when the initial state of the economy is characterized by weak fundamentals such as high
external debt, high past real wages, high country premia, or weak terms of trade. These
ﬁndings shed light on why pressures to abandon the currency peg emerged with force in
Argentina in 2001 and across the emerging-market members of the European Union in the
wake of the great contraction of 2008. Besides being on a ﬁxed exchange rate, these countries
had in common high country premia, high levels of external debt, weak terms of trade, and
a highly unionized labor force that all but prevented nominal wage cuts.
Many observers have suggested the use of ﬁscal policy to ease the pains of currency
pegs currently felt in the periphery of the European Union. However, advocates of active
ﬁscal policy do not speak with a single voice. Some argue that the right medicine for
emerging country members of the European Union is ﬁscal restraint via tax increases and
cuts in public expenditures. Others hold diametrically opposed views and argue that only
widespread increases in government spending and tax cuts can oﬀer pain relief. Our model
suggests that both of these extreme views are misguided. Instead, the model suggests that
the way to ease the pain of a currency peg by means of ﬁscal policy is more sophisticated in
nature. Speciﬁcally, optimal ﬁscal policy in the context of a currency peg consists in a time-
varying labor income subsidy that targets industries with high degrees of downward wage
rigidity. It can be shown that in our currency-peg economy the full-employment equilibrium










t ) denotes the full-employment real wage and γwt−1 denotes the real wage that
prevails when the wage rigidity is binding. If the combination of the currency peg and the
downward nominal wage rigidity prevent the real wage from falling to the full-employment
real wage, the subsidy is positive.
In closing this discussion, we wish to stress that our analysis focuses on the welfare costs
of currency pegs stemming exclusively from nominal wage rigidity. In particular, it does not
consider other sources of welfare loss, nor any beneﬁts of adhering to a currency peg, such
as those created by the presence of liability dollarization, the elimination of exchange rate
risk, or the amelioration of time inconsistency problems in monetary policy. We therefore
interpret the results of this paper as providing indirect evidence that for long lasting currency
pegs or monetary unions, the sum of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary beneﬁts of a single
currency must outweigh the large welfare costs identiﬁed in our analysis.
37Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Consider a set of stochastic processes {ct, cT
t , cN
t , ht, pt, wt, dt+1, λt, µt, ￿t}∞
t=0 satisfying the
conditions given in Deﬁnition 1 and the exchange rate policy (18). We ﬁrst show that ht
must equal ¯ h at all times. This part of the proof is by contradiction. Suppose ht < ¯ h. Then,






t ) ≥ γwt−1, then, by (18) , ￿t = 1, which, together with (21) implies that wt ≤ ω(cT
t ).













Because the left-hand side of this expression is strictly decreasing in ht, we have that ht must
equal ¯ h, which is a contradiction.
Alternatively, if ω(cT
t ) <γ w t−1, then, by (18), we have that ￿t = γwt−1/ω(cT
t ). Then,
combining this expression with (21), we obtain wt = ω(cT
t ). Using again (5), (10), and (17),













Because the left-hand side of this expression is strictly decreasing in ht, we have that the
only solution is ht = ¯ h, which, again, is a contradiction.
We have therefore shown that under the exchange rate policy given in (18), unemployment
is nil at all dates and states. Evaluating (2), (4), (6)-(9), (14) and (15) at ht = ¯ h, we obtain









= βEtλt+1 + µt
µt ≥ 0,
µt(dt+1 − ¯ d)=0 ,
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which are precisely the ﬁrst-order necessary and suﬃcient conditions associated with the
38social planner’s problem consisting in maximizing (19) subject to (4) and (15). The fact
that the ﬁrst-order conditions of the social planner’s problem are necessary and suﬃcient
follows directly from the strict concavity of the planner’s objective and the convexity of the
planner’s constraint set.
Appendix B: The Wealth Elasticity of Traded Consump-
tion
Using the assumed functional forms for preferences and technology, we can write expressions
























Throughout this analysis we drop time subscripts unless otherwise necessary. In the labor
market, the situation depends on the monetary policy in place. Under the optimal policy,
we have full employment at all times, which implies that
c
N =1 .
This expression will also hold under a currency peg in states in which the downward-wage-
rigidity constraint is not binding. By contrast, when this constraint does bind under a
currency peg, the labor market will be in disequilibrium. In this case, we have that pF 0(h)=
γw−1 and cN = F(h), where w−1 denotes the previous period’s real wage rate. Using the




We now proceed to log linearize all of the above expressions around some point ˜ cT for tradable
consumption and unity or nontraded consumption. We denote with a circumﬂex accent log
deviations from this reference point. The log-linearized version of the above expressions is
ˆ c = ηˆ c
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